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BOOK REVIEW
The Effect of the American Revolution on the Law
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE

1760-1830. By William E. Nelson. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press. 1975. Pp. ix,
269. $14.00.
ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY,

Reviewed by James W. Ely, Jr.*
Several years ago a prominent historian questioned the neglect
of the colonial and post-Revolutionary periods by students of American law. Although recognizing that "[w]ork on the law during the
revolutionary period is still in a primitive state,"' he nonetheless
suggested that a large measure of legal continuity might be established between the colonial years and the early national period:
[I]t would seem reasonable to argue that 1750-1800 is the critical period for
legal historians if continuity between colonial and national law is to be demonstrated. . . .Our concern with the public law and constitution-making of the
last part of the century has perhaps blinded us to the persistent characteristics
of private law. In any case, the argument2 for testing the hypothesis of continuity in early American law seems strong.

The hypothesis of continuity has now been ably tested and
challenged by William E. Nelson's fine book, Americanization of
the Common Law. Relying upon years of painstaking research in
courthouse files throughout Massachusetts, Nelson utilizes unpublished opinions, court records, and attorneys' notes to fashion a
striking interpretation of the significant changes that occurred in
Massachusetts law following the Revolution. The author undertakes
an analysis of the doctrines of substantive law and techniques of
law-making and enforcement in order "to trace the emergence of
modern American law. . .

.

Nelson emphasizes the ethical unity and social stability of the
Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. A.B., Princeton University, 1959;
LL.B., Harvard University, 1962; Ph. D., University of Virginia, 1971.
1. Katz, Book Review, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 884 (1966).
2. Id. at 882-83.
3. W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON
MASSACHUSETTS SocIlEY, 1760-1830, at 3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NELSON]. The author is
an associate professor at the Yale Law School. Portions of the book have appeared previously
in article form. Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern CriminalLaw in the Revolutionary Era:
An HistoricalPerspective, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV.450 (1967); Nelson, The Legal Restraintof Power
in Pre-RevolutionaryAmerica: MassachusettsAs a Case Study, 1760-1775, 18 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 1 (1974); Nelson, The Reform of Common Law Pleadingin Massachusetts, 1760-1830:
Adjudication as a Preludeto Legislation, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 97 (1973).
*
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pre-Revolutionary Bay State, which sustained a process of conflict
resolution by "consensus building that produces legal rules acceptable to a broad base of society as a whole." 4 To achieve widespread
acceptance, laws had to reflect the shared values and ideas of the
community.
The author begins his analysis with a detailed consideration of
Massachusetts law in the late colonial period. Citizens of Massachusetts, anxious to restrain governmental power, saw the jury system
as their most important legal institution. Juries in colonial Massachusetts, unlike modem juries, possessed extensive power to decide
the law as well as the facts. In the years before the Revolution nearly
every case was tried before a jury, and the parties usually submitted
the cause under the general issue rather than a special plea. Judicial
devices for controlling jury findings were rarely employed in Massachusetts. For example, instructions by the court were ineffective as
a means of jury regulation. All cases were tried before at least three
judges, each of whom delivered his own charge, seriatim fashion, to
the jury. Moreover, counsel were permitted to argue questions of law
before the jury. As a result, jurors held de facto power to determine
which view of the law was correct.
Several consequences followed from this power of the jury to
find law. Since jury verdicts were not precedent, the law as decided
by jurors had a great potential for adaptation to the circumstances
of individual cases. Hence, Nelson observes that the Massachusetts
practice "gave the legal system real fleiibility while simultaneously
giving the illusion of stability-two values that are important in
doing justice in individual cases and in convincing litigants that
justice has been done them."5 More importantly, the author contends that "the representatives of local communities assembled as
jurors generally had effective power to control the content of the
province's substantive law."' Hence, laywers regularly relied upon
community customs as well as English common law in their arguments before juries. This wide latitude of juries, coupled with the
lack of governmental coercive power and the liability of officials for
damage judgments and statutory penalties, meant that the provincial officers could not govern without the consent of the towns.
Colonial officials were unable to move against those who lived in
accord with local norms. Nelson concludes:
In sum, the only way for officials to ensure enforcement of the law was to
obtain community support for the law, and the best way to obtain that support
4.

NELSON 4.

5. Id. at 29.
6. Id.
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was to permit local communities to determine the substance of the law through
legal institutions such as the jury.7

The substantive law reflected the common ethical values of preRevolutionary Massachusetts. Nelson argues that the criminal law
"was concerned primarily with protecting community religious and
moral values."8 Sexual transgressions and offenses against religion
constituted a majority of all criminal prosecutions. Similarly, the
extensive remedies afforded creditors were "at least in part, a product of a shared moral or religious belief that debtors ought to make
full repayment of all they had received." 9 Contract and property
rules protected social stability and "insured that the distribution of
wealth did not change substantially or rapidly over time and that
men had well-defined places in their community ... ."10 The society not only guaranteed a subsistence income through the poor
laws, but sought to maintain the existing pattern of resource allocation. Customary rights received generous protection. Prevailing contract doctrines impeded speculation and overreaching and endeavored to ensure that exchanges of goods or services occur at a customary rate. Such rules were designed to promote ethical living, not
economic efficiency or the pursuit of wealth.
Nelson sees no evidence that the Revolutionary leaders intended to alter the legal system of Massachusetts. Nonetheless, the
efforts by the Revolutionary generation to justify the war set loose
new intellectual movements that transformed the legal structurp of
the Bay State. The ethical unity inherited from the colonial period
was gradually destroyed, with significant and often unexpected results. Ironically, the social structure that the Revolution sought to
preserve was consumed by the forces of change.
The first breach took place in the 1780's, amid demands for the
reform of legal institutions and procedures considered expensive or
oppressive. Adopting a new style of politics, the reformers did not
labor to build a consensus and relied on power rather than persuasion. Furthermore, the abolition of common-law pleading, which
occurred piecemeal over half a century, began to produce unforeseen
consequences. As the bar started to think in new substantive categories, law was seen less as a series of writs and procedures and more
as a set of standards dictating conduct. Once lawyers debated which
values ought to control a case, "they made plain the existence of
differences over fundamental social values."'
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 35.
Id.at 37.
Id.at 45.
Id.at 46.
Id.at88.
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The heightened concern for liberty that emerged after the Revolution also proved a catalyst for a new perception of law. PostRevolutionary libertarianism, the author maintains, was "a potent
force for legal change-perhaps the most potent one in the closing
decades of the eighteenth century."12 First, because authority resided in the people, not the crown, there was a greater willingness
to vest power in government. Legislation came to rest on sovereignty
and the power of the majority, not on conformity with past
principles. Thus, liability of officials in common-law damage actions was curtailed. Secondly, the concept of liberty as procedural
fairness was widely shared. The law of criminal procedure was reformed, and Nelson notes that Massachusetts judges "in their effort
to promote liberty, decided nearly every question of criminal procedure that came before them in a manner favorable to defendants
accused of crime."13 Thirdly, the libertarian impulse manifested
itself in post-Revolutionary egalitarianism. In the early 1780's Massachusetts courts moved toward the abolition of slavery. The status
of women changed more slowly, but by the 1820's courts recognized
the right of a wife to run a business separately from her husband.
The most far-reaching egalitarian move was the disestablishment of
the Congregational Church by the Constitution of 1780, which created instead a nondenominational Protestant religious establishment that placed all sects on an equal footing. 4
These libertarian changes in the law, products of the breakdown of shared ethical concepts, contributed to the decline of the
idea that government should enforce morality. Nelson asserts that,
over a period of time, "the abandonment by government of its enforcement role . . . impair[ed] the notion that there was any one

set of ethical standards that all men ought to obey."" Nelson notes
a marked decline in prosecutions for fornication and religious violations after the Revolution and a corresponding increase in crimes
against the social order "as individuals took it upon themselves to
act in accordance with their own ethical code."'" Criminal law became concerned largely with the protection of property. The collapse of the older unity of values also was reflected in the harsh
12. Id. at 90.
13. Id. at 101.
14. While Nelson recognizes that "liberty" had different meanings, his treatment of
libertarianism raises some problems of terminology. Should an increase in "the arbitrary
power of a majoritarian legislature" be classed as a libertarian change? Is it accurate to
present egalitarian movements as an aspect of the libertarian impulse? It does not require
much reflection to perceive the potential conflict between equality and liberty. This reviewer
questions whether libertarianism is the best description for such diverse legal themes.
15. NELSON 111.
16. Id. at 115.
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political rhetoric of the early nineteenth century and the changing
views of the meaning of an oath. The author states that, with such
attitudinal shifts, "the inherited legal system of Massachusetts was
deprived both of its ultimate justification-the preservation of a
shared ethical unity-and of its sole means of resolving disputes-an appeal to that unity.""
Simultaneously a new understanding of property and contract
law undermined the economic and social stability of the state. Fear
of lawlessness and mob rule impelled conservatives to seek protection for order and property. On the other hand, popular majorities
endeavored to impose a "public interest concept" on the use of
private property.. As a consequence of these conflicting policy interests, "private property was ceasing to be seen as an institution that
promoted community values and was becoming instead a tool for
the aggrandizement of the individual.""8 The corporation likewise
was transformed from a quasi-public institution into a device for the
advancement of individual self-interest. Post-Revolutionary contract law permitted persons to enter into whatever bargains they
wished and assumed that the law should enforce all contracts without reference to customary usage. Once the legal system afforded
freedom to make economic bargains, "many men used their wealth
chiefly for the purpose of acquiring even greater wealth."' 9
The emergence of a desire to promote economic growth completed the destruction of the pre-Revolutionary society. Courts
began to analyze cases in terms of the needs of business, with emphasis on certainty and predictability in the law. Major modifications in debtor-creditor laws, such as bankruptcy legislation, were
advanced to encourage widespread participation in economic development. The preferred position for the first user of a natural resource was overturned because the initial developer might not utilize the resource in a way most profitable to society. This concern
for economic growth caused men to reconsider the broad role of
juries. Certainty was impossible if jurors remained free to find law.
The problems created by juries that determined law were compounded by the breakdown of social unity in the state. Thus, during
the years 1804-1810 juries ceased to articulate ethical standards of
community conduct and the law-finding function was transferred to
the judges. In the nineteenth century, Nelson concludes,
the law came to be a tool by which those interest groups that had emerged
victorious in the competition for control of law-making institutions could seize
17.

Id. at 116.

18.
19.

Id. at 133.
Id. at 143.
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most 2of
society's wealth for themselves and enforce their seizure upon the
0
losers.

Carefully researched and persuasively presented, Nelson's work
represents a major contribution to the growing literature of American legal history. The validity of his thesis outside Massachusetts,
however, is open to question. While the author recognizes that the
Massachusetts experience was unique, he nevertheless suggests that
a study of the Bay State can furnish "working hypotheses" for the
transformation of pre-Revolutionary American law.2 ' Nearly all
scholars would agree that law in the nineteenth century responded
to pressures different from those of the colonial period. Lawrence M.
Friedman, for example, presents a view of the direction of legal
change that accords with Nelson's view:
But if colonial law had been, in the first place, colonial, and in the second
place, paternal, emphasizing order and the struggle against sin, then, gradually a new set of attitudes developed, in which the primary function of law
was not suppression but service. In this period, law was seen more and more
as a utilitarian tool: to protect property and the established order, of course,
but beyond that, to further the interests of the middle-class mass, to foster
growth, to release and harness energy latent in the commonwealth.?

Still, the degree and process of post-Revolutionary legal innovation
may not have been as pronounced in other states as in Massachusetts. For example, recent scholarship has indicated the persistence
of a large amount of conservatism and continuity in South Carolina
law after the Revolution.3
Nelson's analysis of pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts law
places great weight upon the ethical unity and shared goals of local
communities. It would seem that such a consensus was built upon
the ethnic unity and religious homogeneity of colonial Massachusetts.24 While one can readily agree that other New England states
settled as a part of the Puritan migration would reflect a similar
type of unity, it is more difficult to find this condition outside the
20. Id. at 174.
21. Id. at 3.

22.

L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERIcAN LAW 99-100 (1973). See also J.W. HURST, LAW
6-32 (1956).
23. D. Senese, Legal Thought in South Carolina, 1800-1860, 1970 (unpublished disserta.
tion in University of South Carolina Library); Ely, American Independence and the Law: A
Study of Post-RevolutionarySouth CarolinaLegislation, 26 VAND. L. Rav. 939 (1973); HarriAND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES

son, A Study of the EarliestReported Decisionsof the South CarolinaCourts of Law, 16 AM.

J. LEGAL HIsT. 51 (1972).
24. Other scholars have stressed that a desire for accommodation and unanimity, not

majoritarianism, governed Massachusetts towns. "The community they desired was an enclave of common believers," Michael Zucherman observes, "and to the best of their ability
they secured such a society, rooted not only in ethical and cultural homogeneity but also in
common moral and economic ideas and practices." Zucherman, The Social Context of Democracy in Massachusetts,25 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 523, 538-39 (1968).
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areas of Puritan domination. 25 Colonial New York was highly heterogeneous and faction ridden." To what extent did this alter the development of law in New York? How did the presence of a large slave
population affect the legal system of the southern colonies? 27 These
questions are not adequately answered by reference to the Massachusetts model. Furthermore, court structures varied among the
colonies. Did the absence of a chancery court in colonial
Massachu8
setts influence the course of legal development?
Studies of criminal prosecutions in other colonies indicate a
different pattern from that which emerges from Nelson's work.
Douglas Greenberg concluded that "the serious crime rate in New
York was substantially higher than in Massachusetts." 29 Crimes of
violence and theft accounted for a large percentage of prosecutions
in provincial New York. Virginia and South Carolina only infrequently punished adultery and fornication, while bastardy proceedings were primarily instituted to protect the parish poor funds."
David H. Flaherty doubted that colonial criminal law changed abruptly at the time of the Revolution:
The close identification of sins and crimes had started to change long before
this time. Many jurisdictions had begun to ignore fornication much earlier in
the eighteenth century."

Scholars also have offered opinions about criminal behavior in
the Bay State that differ from those of Nelson. Noting the postRevolutionary increase in prosecutions for drunkenness, Michael S.
Hindus has argued that "crimes against morality never ceased to be
a concern of the legal system."32 He further suggested that the rate
of sexual offenses may be related more to shifts in sexual conduct
25. The settlers of Connecticut and New Hampshire shared the religious and ethical
convictions of Massachusetts citizens, and their legal institutions mirrored those of the Bay
State.
26. P. BONOMI, A FACTious PEOPLE: POLITICS AND SocIm IN COLONiAL NEW YORK (1971);
I. MARK, AGRARIAN CONFLICTS IN COLONIAL NEW YORK, 1711-1775 (1940).
27. See P. WOOD, BLACK MAJORrrY: NEGROES IN COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1670
THROUGH THE STONO REBELLION (1974).
28. Curran, The Struggle for Equity Jurisdictionin Massachusetts, 31 B.U.L. REv. 269
(1951); Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversiesover Chancery Courts
and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, 5 PERSPECTIVES AM. HIsT. 257 (1971).
29. D. Greenberg, Crime in Provincial New York 2, Apr. 19, 1975 (unpublished paper
presented to the Organization of American Historians).
30. A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 280 (1930); M. Hindus, The Social
Context of Crime in Massachusetts and South Carolina, 1760-1873: Theoretical and Quantitative Perspectives 17, Dec. 28, 1974 (unpublished paper presented to the American Historical
Ass'n).
31. Flaherty, Law and the Enforcement of Moralsin EarlyAmerica, 5 PERsPEcrIVEs AM.
HIST. 203, 247 (1971).
32. Hindus, supra note 30, at 16.
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than a transformation of the legal system. 3 None of this is to detract
from Nelson's achievement, but it does counsel caution in generalizing from his findings.
In addition, although well versed in the recent social histories
of New England, the author sometimes fails to treat the broader
political dimensions of his topic. For instance, he neglects the political aspects of judicial reform in post-Revolutionary Massachusetts.
The Federalist Party favored strengthening the court system, while
limiting the power of juries to the determination of facts. Jeffersonian Republicans, on the other hand, defended the right of jurors
to interpret the law. 4 Likewise, Nelson does not discuss the codification movement of the 1820's, which reflected continued discontent
with the law of Massachusetts.3 5 Nelson tends to present legal developments as a category of intellectual history, isolated from currents
in society as a whole.
The author's conclusion that governments were increasingly
able to exercise coercive power upon dissident minorities also warrants scrutiny. Nelson believes that the locus of authority moved in
the post-Revolutionary period from local communities to the states.
Statewide political institutions did not attempt to rule by means of
consensus, but rather secured only sufficient backing to make a
decision enforceable. In particular, Nelson notes that the New York
anti-rent movement of the 1840's was suppressed "with hardly any
effort at all" and that "whenever large-scale resistance occurred it
was readily suppressed by military force.""8
As the scope of the governing unit grew larger, it undoubtedly
became easier to isolate recalcitrant groups and compel their obedience to law. Still, the author may exaggerate the efficacy of governmental enforcement. It has always been difficult for the government
to fly in the face of the wishes of an important segment of the
population. American legal history provides numerous examples of
the gap between formally proclaimed values and popular acceptance. The difficulties of enforcing racial equality and prohibition of
alcohol illustrate the possibilities for successful evasion and passive
resistance. Extra-legal violence, a legacy of the Revolutionary period, has never been far from the American experience.1 7 The ob33. See Smith & Hindus, PremaritalPregnancy in America, 1640-1971: An Overview
and Interpretation,5 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 537 (1975).

34. R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN
229 (1971).

CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC

184-

35. A. CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 51-56 (1962); C. Cook,
The American Codification Movement: A Study of Antebellum Legal Reform, 1974 (unpublished dissertation in the University of Maryland Library).
36. NELSON, supra note 3, at 173.
37. Brown, Violence and the American Revolution, in ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN
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struction of the return of fugitive slaves, nativist riots, and Klan
violence are all indications that force has been used to frustrate an
announced policy. More specifically, this reviewer suggests that the
New York anti-rent movement was not easily put down, and that
the state government temporized and contented itself with meeting
only acts of force against public officials. In contrast with Nelson, a
historian of the New York estates has argued:
It is the lesson that all government depends on the consent of the governed,
not only in majoritarian theory but in hard political necessity. Real compulsion can only be exercised on a very few by an overwhelming majority. When
any substantial part of a people reach the point of refusal to conform, government in some part changes or ceases to function3

Nelson's stress upon nineteenth century majoritarianism and governmental coercion must be qualified by consideration of the difficulties inherent in the enforcement of any policy against the wishes
of a large or determined minority. The role of consensus in the
process of colonial conflict resolutions, which the author emphasizes, retains a measure of vitality in our own day.
While some of the author's conclusions will stir debate, his work
will prove most helpful in further study of legal changes in the wake
of the Revolution. By not limiting himself to published opinions of
higher courts and the pronouncements of leading lawyers and treatise writers, he has been able to probe the legal process as it affected
daily life in Massachusetts. Nelson's compact but readable book is
a valuable addition, if perhaps not the final word, that will greatly
assist our understanding of America's legal past.
81 (S. Kurtz & J. Hutson, eds. 1973).
38. Sutherland, The Tenantry on the New York Manors: A Chapterof Legal History,
41 CORNELL L.Q. 620 (1956).
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